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Excise Taxes and Commodity Promotion:
Bayesian Retrieval of the Optimum
Garth John Holloway
This article shows how the solution to the promotion problem—the problem of
locating the optimal level of advertising in a downstream market—can be derived
simply, empirically, and robustly through the application of some simple calculus
and Bayesian econometrics. We derive the complete distribution of the level of
promotion that maximizes producer surplus and generate recommendations about
patterns as well as levels of expenditure that increase net returns. The theory and
methods are applied to quarterly series (1978:2S1988:4) on red meats promotion
by the Australian Meat and Live-Stock Corporation. A slightly different pattern
of expenditure would have profited lamb producers.
Key Words:  Bayesian estimation, commodity promotion as an experiment, distri-
bution of the optimum, Taylor-series expansion
This article derives a formal test of the hypothesis that a commodity promotion
program is “efficient.” By efficient, we mean that the observed expenditure level and
the one that maximizes some welfare criterion are the same. The welfare criterion
that we adopt is the level of (farmgate) surplus that is generated from sale of the
farm commodity. Movements in the commodity price affect this surplus, and the
program’s objective is to raise this price. This objective is achieved, indirectly, by
first raising the corresponding retail price. Given a rise in the retail price, farmgate
demand expands, causing the commodity price to rise along the (upward-sloping)
commodity supply curve. But, for many reasons, raising retail price is a tricky
operation and, in this context, administrators must enact decisions with incomplete
information. Uncertainty arises due to vagaries in consumer responsiveness to prices
of competing products, health trends, and the effects of the promotion program itself,
and this uncertainty raises interesting questions for applied economic analysis.
Principal among these is the notion that the desired level of promotion is discovered
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through trial and error. It follows naturally that the optimal level of expenditure to
administer is a random variable and, with this notion at hand, a natural way to
characterize the “optimum” is to derive an explicit distribution and compare this
distribution with the observed distribution of expenditure that the program generates.
This is the concept we will pursue in this analysis. To date, the concept has not been
exploited in the literature, and thus its analysis makes the current study novel, but
also enlightening. It is enlightening because it is capable of identifying not only an
optimal level, but also an optimal distribution of expenditure. Hence, the results of
our investigation have the potential to generate new insights and, possibly, method-
ologies aimed at gaining a greater understanding of promotion programs and their
worth. Motivating these ideas is the main objective of the exercise.
Relegating details until later, the optimal level of promotion is the level at which
a marginal increase in expenditure leaves the commodity price unchanged. Here,
“price” refers to the net, per unit return to the farm commodity. It is a post-
promotion, post-tax price. The intuition for why it must remain invariant is simple
and is articulated graphically in Holloway (1998, p. 189). The intuition follows from
the fact that farm profits are monotonically increasing in price. Ceteris paribus, the
(post-promotion) price rises in response to an increase in expenditure, but it must
also fall in response to an increase in the tax that is required to fund the increase in
expenditure. At any optimum, the net impact of the two forces must balance because
it is only then that all of the net returns to the program are exhausted. Therefore, at
the optimum, marginal adjustments must leave (the post-promotion, post-tax) price
unchanged.
Unfortunately, locating the optimum raises some mathematical complications. In
an effort to preserve continuity, we relegate much of this detail to an appendix,
focusing instead in the body of the article on intuition and a few essential formulae.
The basic theory is sketched in the section below, followed by a discussion of
econometric implications and a section that motivates the estimation method. The
application to Australian data is then reported, followed by the presentation of the
empirical model. Conclusions are offered in the final section.
Theory of the Optimum
As outlined in Holloway (1998), the essential features of a promotion program are
three-fold. First, promotion output targeted for a downstream market is the result of
a production process. Second, the production process creating the output incurs a
cost. Third, in order to raise the funds necessary to cover this cost, a tax must be
enacted. The purpose of this section is to relate these concepts to a refutable condi-
tion that can be used empirically to characterize the optimum. We begin from the
intuition already outlined—that, at the optimum, marginal adjustments must leave
(the post-promotion, post-tax) price unchanged. The calculus leading to this con-
clusion is presented in Holloway [1998, equations (2), (3), and (4), p. 191], and is
summarized by the following equation:Holloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   137
(1) pττπ % pπ ' 0,
where p denotes price; τ denotes the tax rate levied for the purpose of raising
revenue; subscripts denote partial derivatives; and the endogeneity of the tax rate,
τ = τ(π), is recognized explicitly through the derivative τπ. Note that equation (1) and
the condition ∆p = 0 are equivalent. But, working with equation (1), we are able to
construct an equilibrium condition that will prove useful in subsequent develop-
ments. This condition evolves naturally from interpreting observed expenditure as
the result of experiment, at least locally, in the neighborhood of the equilibrium
defined by (1).
Commodity Promotion as an Experiment
Let denote the optimal level of promotion measured in the continuum of expen- ˆ π
diture, π. In depicting the optimum, our objective is to characterize a probability
distribution, say This distribution is important because it summarizes all the g(ˆ π*Ξ).
relevant information for optimum promotion decision making. Because these deci-
sions are made in a trial-and-error setting, the distribution of the optimum is condi-
tioned by the available data, Ξ, and it follows naturally that Bayesian estimation is
appropriate. An estimation strategy that follows logically from interpreting observed
expenditure as the result of trial and error, and provides the basis for the Bayesian
approach that follows, evolves from two facts. First, because the left-hand side of
(1) denotes a partial derivative of an objective function defined over promotion
expenditure, it is, by assumption, a function of the control, π. Second, because the
optimum is characterized entirely in terms of a derivative, it is no less restrictive to
analyze local departures through a Taylor-series expansion of the first-order condi-
tion, and interpret sample variance in expenditure as the result of experiment.
Hence, rewriting the first-order condition noting that (by defin- ƒ(π) / pττπ% pπ,
ition of the optimum) and introducing the second-order (slope) parameter ƒ(ˆ π) / 0,
α / local departures around (1) evolve according to ƒπ(ˆ π),
(2) α(π & ˆ π) ' 0.
The expression on the left is exact at the point of departure and holds as an approxi-
mation as we move away from the point But, in the neighborhood of either π ' ˆ π.ˆ π,
(1) or (2) suffices. The second interpretation has the advantage that it generates
observations on the distribution of the optimum.
In order to retrieve this distribution, we focus on a set of comparative-static exper-
iments that are relevant to the equilibrium in the marketing system. Relegating
details to the appendix, the reduced form consists of the set of price-quantity pairs
that are relevant to the commodity in question (price-quantity pairs in the distribu-
tion, retailing and processing sectors, and the price and quantity at the farmgate) and
one additional equation. This additional equation states simply that the revenue from138   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
commodity taxation equals expenditure on the program. Except for this equation, the
reduced form is completely general. If we assume that the tax is a per unit levy and
that the level of promotion is small in relation to aggregate demand for promotion
services, then the equation
(3) κπ ' τq
completes the equilibrium. This is the revenue-equals-cost constraint, where κ
denotes the (fixed) per unit cost of promotion, and q denotes the quantity of the
commodity exchanged at equilibrium.
It follows from some tedious manipulations (outlined in the appendix), and from
the form of equation (3), that reduced-form elasticities depicting farmgate price,
quantity, and tax-rate changes are, respectively:
(4) ψpπ / α(π & ˆ π)π
pq
,
ψqπ / gα(π & ˆ π)π
pq
,
ψτπ / pq & gα(π & ˆ π)π
pq
.
Here, the expression defines an elasticity computed from total ψij/ ˜ i/ ˜ j ( ˜ k / ∆k/k)
differentiation of the marketing system, and   defines the (farmgate) supply g / pqq/p
flexibility computed from partial differentiation of the (farm-commodity) inverse-
supply schedule. Consequently, each of the elasticities in (4) are functions of the
parameters (α, g, and ) and the data (p, q, and π), and our task is to retrieve the ˆ π
distributions of the former from observations on the latter. We are primarily inter-
ested in the distribution g(ˆ π *Ξ).
Bayesian Retrieval of the Optimum
In line with the Taylor-series development underlying equation (2), observations in
the time series are interpreted as repeated experiments about the unknown optimum.
Given t observations in the time series, the reduced-form equations depicting propor-
tional changes in the commodity price (p), the commodity quantity (q), and the levy
(τ) can be written as the linear system:
(5) Y ' ZΠ % V,
where, in a standard notation (e.g., Drèze and Richard, 1983, p. 519),  ) Yt×m/(˜ p,˜ q,˜ τ
is a matrix of observations on the three {m = 3} endogenous variables;  / ; Zt×n (˜ π;˜ κ
is a matrix of observations on {n} exogenous variables (respectively, the ˜ z1,..., ˜ zn&2)Holloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   139
1  The analysis is not independent of which equation to delete, and the choice of the tax rate is particularly advan-
tageous. Because the actual farmgate levy is used frequently to fund a variety of ancillary activities (e.g., research and
development, market surveys, or other forms of evaluation), the rate implicit to the advertising program is usually
unobserved.
level of promotion expenditure, the per unit cost of promotion services, and a vector
of {n ! 2} shift variables—for example, prices of substitute goods at retail, dispos-
able income in the retail sector, and prices of nonprimary inputs at other stages of
the marketing chain); is a matrix of coefficients of the exogenous variables Π(n×m)
[of which equations (4) comprise a subset]; and the error matrix,  is assumed V(t×m),
to be distributed  where  specifies covariance among the col- N(0, ΩqIt), Ω(m×m)
umns of V. In the context of estimation, and in view of the (revenue-equals-cost)
constraint in (3), at least one column in V is a linear combination of two others,
implying that the matrix Ω is singular. For this reason, the tax-rate equation is
excluded from estimation and we focus attention on the commodity price and
quantity equations.
1 Hence, only the first two expressions in (4) are estimated.
Accordingly, the dimension of Π is reduced, and interest centers on isolating
and estimating the parameters appearing in the first two rows of  Con- Π(n×(m&1)).
viently, the additive forms of these two expressions permit separation of parameters





















;˜ κ;˜ zn&1,..., ˜ zn&2 .
Hence, each of the distributions of interest is now retrievable. From the first two
rows in (6), each of the parameters is identified in sequential fashion: α is identified;
conditional on α,  is identified; and conditional on α and  g is identified. With ˆ π ˆ π,
these technicalities behind us, an algorithm for retrieving the distributions of in-
terest,  follows easily from some standard results on g(α*Ξ), g(ˆ π*Ξ), and g(g*Ξ),
the natural-conjugate, normal-linear model (Zellner, 1971, pp. 224S240). It is
based on four observations. First, given the data, the conditional distribution of the140   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
2  As a colleague points out, it is worth emphasizing some subtle relationships that exist between the two constraints
α # 0 and  There are two. First, the restriction α # 0 is a necessary condition for the existence of a local optimum, ˆ π $ 0.
for which the restriction  characterizes a feasible set of configurations for the program. Note, of course, that point ˆ π $ 0
mass at zero (in other words, the outcome  is feasible and is enlightening, but only in the event that α # 0. ˆ π ' 0)
Second, as shown in the appendix, the two constraints are not independent. In fact, due to the relationship between
α and  in (6), the sampling procedure that generates the distribution  is affected fundamentally by the restriction ˆ π ˆ π $ 0
α # 0.
covariance matrix, Ω, is inverse-Wishart. Second, given the data and a draw for the
covariance matrix, the distribution of the coefficient matrix, Π, is normal. Third,
given the draw for the coefficient matrix, each of the parameters of interest (α,, ˆ π
and g) is identified from a nonlinear transformation of specific elements in Π.
Fourth, because it is easy to sample from the distributions in question, this sampling
procedure can be repeated a large number of times and the output can be used to plot
histograms corresponding to the relevant distributions. Details are presented in the
appendix.
Refinements
Prior to discussing the application, four points are noteworthy. First, some flexi-
bility in estimation is available should the researcher have reason to believe that the
farm-quantity (rather than the farm-price) equation may lead to more precise
estimates of the optimum. However, in applications to time series over short
periodicities (such as the present one), it is unlikely that this will be the case.
Second, in the extreme case where quantities are reasonably assumed fixed in the
sample period, the same procedure can be applied to the (single-equation) estima-
tion of farm-price movements. Two modifications are required in this circumstance.
The draw in the first step of the algorithm is inverse-Gamma, and the draw in the
second step is multivariate-normal. Third, problems of encountering outliers are a
concern whenever the parameters in the denominator of the computations in the
second step are located near zero. In situations where the potential number of out-
liers is considerable, or their numerical values are large, or both, it is recommended
that these observations be discarded from the sample. The problem of constructing
a (subjective) criterion for stopping can be handled by discarding, simultaneously,
the endpoints of the distributions until the base of each of the frequency increments
contains at least one observation. Finally, in situations in which the curvature of the
objective function lies in question, probabilities that parameter α takes a particular
sign are easily constructed from the output of the sample. Moreover, constraints
such as α # 1,  (as predicated by the theory) are easily imposed by ˆ π $ 0, or g $ 0
modifying the draws in the second step to be truncated-normal.
2 This can be achiev-
ed easily through a simple accept-reject mechanism, whereby draws are continued
until a draw from the desired region is obtained. An efficient one-to-one draw
(using the probability-integral transform) is outlined in Chib (1992).Holloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   141
3  A reviewer questions the statistical properties of the test procedure, but these properties are actually well known.
Due to the fact that the regressor matrix, Z, changes across the 81-point grid, the evaluations reduce simply to compari-
sons of posterior probabilities across each of the 81 (nonnested) regression models. The formulae for their comparison
are developed in Zellner [1971, pp. 306S309, equations (10.33)S(10.48)].
Application
The theory and procedures are applied to a consistent set of quarterly observations
(1977:2S1988:4) on red meats advertising by the Australian Meat and Live-Stock
Corporation (AMLC). The AMLC has, since the beginning of 1977, conducted a
multi-media (radio, television, and newspaper) campaign in an effort to stem
declines of domestic consumption of red meats (predominantly beef and lamb).
Declines in consumption of both commodities accelerated significantly in the early
1970s, and lamb consumers in particular have shown little tendency of redirecting
this trend. Application of the theory to the Australian lamb market requires three
features of the marketing environment to be considered prior to estimation. A first
issue concerns the significance of international trade in domestic price determin-
ation; a second concerns the timing of promotion expenditure in relation to the
timing of transactions in the domestic retail market and the relationship, in turn,
between this transaction and the sale of the raw commodity; third, because the data
are quarterly observations, an appropriate specification of quarterly supply response
must be selected.
Because the data periodicity is significantly less than the time considered to adjust
effectively supplies of live animals, the application is undertaken based on the
assumption that supply is fixed [in other words, that parameter g in equation (6)
tends to infinity]. Turning to the appropriate lag specification in the promotion-
retail-farm sequence, a grid search is conducted in order to locate the lag combin-
ation that maximizes posterior probability across combinations, up to a maximum
of eight quarters. The procedure amounts to comparing the (posterior-means)
residual sums of squares across a (9 × 9 = 81 point) grid. The optimal promotion-
to-retail response is four quarters, and the optimal retail-to-farm response is six
quarters.
3
Finally, in an effort to account for trade effects, the structure of the export lamb
market is considered. Key export destinations for Australian lamb are the major
coastal centers in the eastern and western United States. Therefore, preliminary
estimation was conducted on a time series that includes demand- and trade-shift
variables that are relevant to these markets. Specifically, the impacts of the U.S.-
Australian exchange rate, U.S. prices of substitute meats (beef, pork, chicken), and
U.S. meat expenditure are considered. Dependence of movements in Australian farm
prices on each of these variables is negligible, implying that export conditions are
not strong determinants of domestic equilibrium in the Australian lamb market.
Consequently, the remaining discussion focuses on domestic price determination
with fixed supplies of live animals and four- and six-period lags, respectively, in
promotion-to-retail and retail-to-farm linkages.142   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
The Empirical Model
Prior to estimation, the data are converted to logarithmic differences. That is, we
replace  [as defined below (4)] with its empirical counterpart,  ! ˜ k /∆k/k ˜ k / log(kt)
log( In the estimation, we restrict attention to the relationship between farm- kt&1).
price movements and 12 regressors. Respectively, these 12 regressors are identified
as follows [see equation (7)]:
1. promotion expenditure ($Aus 000) squared times the proportional change
in expenditure, normalized by commodity revenue (henceforth, “promotion
squared”);
2. promotion expenditure ($Aus 000) times the proportional change in expen-
diture, normalized by commodity revenue (henceforth, simply denoted “pro-
motion”) ($Aus 000);
3. an index of per unit promotion costs (the aggregate promotion costs index
for Australia, as in Ball and Dewbre, 1989, table 12);
4S6. domestic retail prices of beef, pork, and chicken (cents per kilogram);
7. retail meat expenditure ($Aus 000);
8. wholesale lamb quantities (metric tons, assumed to be exogenous); and
9S12. four quarterly dummy variables (the regression excludes a constant).
The source for the promotion data is Ball and Dewbre (1989, tables 11S13). For the
remaining variables, various publications of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
and Resource Economics (ABARE) are used.
Figure 1 presents nominal expenditure ($Aus 000) on red meats promotion by the
AMLC. The upper panel presents the quarterly pattern over the time series (1978:2S
1988:4), and the lower panel depicts the empirical distribution of the quarterly
expenditure across percentile increments in the range $Aus 100 (1978:3) to $Aus
748,000 (1988:3). The numbers at the base of the lower panel are, respectively, from
left to right, the minimum, the mean, and the maximum expenditure in the time
series. The question we now consider is whether this distribution is “optimal.”
Results
Table 1 reports numerical results and figure 2 reports plots of key distributions
obtained from single-equation, unconstrained estimation with a sample size set at
S = 10,000. There are 194 outliers, leaving a total of 9,806 remaining observations.
The outliers are defined according to the previous convention whereby the
outermost observations in the sample are discarded until each 1% increment in the
domain of the distribution contains at least one observation. The two distributions
appearing in figure 2 are the second-order derivative of the objective function (α)Holloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   143
Figure 1.  AMLC promotion expenditure (1973:2S1988:4)
and the optimal level of promotion expenditure  The numbers on the vertical axis (ˆ π).
represent the sampling frequencies of percentile increments, and the numbers on the
horizontal axis are, respectively, from left to right, the minimum, the mean, and the
maximum of the sample observations remaining after removing outliers. The distri-
bution of the slope parameter (α)—which is normal—is dispersed, but has a mode
at a negative value (!0.002); a significant proportion of its mass lies in the negative
domain. The distribution of the optimum  which is not normal—is peaked with (ˆ π)—
long tails and appears to be centered about its mean ($Aus 242,000).
Other measures of interest are summarized in table 1. Generally speaking, the
farm price responds positively to the price of pork, negatively to lamb quantity and
to the first-quarter dummy variable, and is not significantly affected by the remain-
ing regressors. These are reasonable results in the context of the marketing system
for lamb, and they are somewhat expected. But their most significant implication is
their prediction about optimal promotion expenditure. The mean of the distribution
of the optimum ($Aus 242,000) exceeds the mean of the empirical distribution
($Aus 159,000) by a considerable margin—about 52% of the mean of the empirical
distribution. Thus, with a few caveats (discussed below), lamb producers would have
benefitted from an overall increase in promotion expenditure.144   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
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   Probability  0.181 α $ 0
(0.385)
   Probability  0.343 ˆ π # 0
(0.475)
   Sample size   9,806   9,922Holloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   145
 Figure 2.  Posterior distributions: Single-equation,
 unrestricted estimation
Given the locations of the unrestricted distributions, it is likely that the theoretical
constraints  are compatible with the data. As indicated previously, α # 0a n dˆ π $ 0
these restrictions can be tested conveniently by truncating the draws of the first two
coefficients in the price equation. The results of the restricted estimation are pre-
sented in the second numeric column of table 1. There are 78 outliers, leaving a
sample size of 9,922 observations. Neither the means nor the (numerical) standard
errors of the estimates appear to be greatly affected by the restrictions. Moreover,
the probabilities that  are 0.18 and 0.34 (with standard errors 0.38 α >0a n dˆ π <0
and 0.48), respectively. Thus, we conclude that the data are reasonably compatible
with the theoretical restrictions.
Figure 3 presents reports of the distributions of the slope term (α) and the opti-
mum  obtained from restricted estimation. The values at the bases of the two (ˆ π)
panels are, respectively, from left to right, the minimum, the mean, and the maxi-
mum of the observations in the sample. The left-wise skewness in the distribution
of α is obvious and, compared to the unrestricted estimate, its mean has declined
somewhat (to around !0.003), which is to be expected. The distribution of the
optimum  also exhibits skewness, but in this case the skewness is rightward. (ˆ π)146   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
 Figure 3.  Posterior distributions: Single-equation,
 restricted estimation
Significantly, the mean of the distribution ($Aus 316,000) represents almost a 100%
increase over the mean of the observed distribution ($Aus 159,000). Thus, we
conclude once again that an increase in mean expenditure would have profited lamb
producers.
These conclusions are supported in different terms by the graphic in figure 4. The
figure compares the empirical distribution of promotion expenditure (upper panel),
with the distribution of the optimum obtained from unrestricted estimation (center
panel), and the distribution of the optimum obtained from restricted estimation
(lower panel). In order to aid visual inspection, both of the posterior distributions are
truncated to an interval that is approximately twice the length of the domain of the
empirical distribution (approximately ± $Aus 1.5 million). The tick marks signify
increments of $Aus 500,000, but also report the means of the respective distri-
butions. The graphic clearly reveals differences in expenditure that would improve
lamb producer profits. When the theoretical constraints  are ignored, α # 0a n dˆ π $ 0
the distribution of the optimum is quite normal, and is peaked; but when the
constraints are imposed, the distribution resembles that of an inverse-Gamma
distribution with low degrees of freedom. In both cases, however, evidence of anHolloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   147
    Figure 4.  Observed, unrestricted-optimal, and restricted-
    optimal distributions
overallocation in the lower percentiles of the empirical distribution is apparent. The
average level of observed expenditure lies below the means of the distributions of
the two optima, but the patterns of expenditure are, perhaps, more informative. The
patterns in the lower panels suggest that a small but significant frequency of expen-
diture at levels twice the maximum of the observed expenditure would be beneficial.
Adjusting promotion expenditure in this manner would have profited Australian
lamb producers.
Summary and Policy Conclusions
This article extends the logic of a recent contribution to show how inferences about
the optimal level of promotion can be retrieved empirically, conveniently, and
robustly using Bayesian techniques. The approach is attractive because it yields
enlightening results with fundamental implications, not only for the mean, but for
the entire distribution of promotion expenditure. In this respect, the policy conclu-
sions stemming from our findings warrant closer scrutiny.148   Spring 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
The principal rationale for the introduction and use of commodity promotion
schemes is that they provide an effective means of raising farm income. A logical
consequence of this assumption is a question surrounding the level of promotion
expenditures that should be applied, taking account of the farm-price impacts of
retail-demand shifts, changes in costs of production in the marketing sector, and
changes in supply conditions in farming itself. This point is worth emphasizing;
prediction about the appropriate levels of promotion expenditure is the overarching
measurement issue confronting executives of commodity-promotion schemes. In
confronting this issue directly, the methodology employed here provides clear and
precise answers to this policy question. This is the principal objective addressed in
the paper. However, unlike the bulk of previous contributions that have sought
point-estimate predictions, the ones contained here are more comprehensive
because they generate predictions about complete distributions of expenditure. In
short, given the assumption that the optimum level of expenditure is a random
variable, an optimal distribution (pattern of expenditure) exists. This article has
shown how the existence of this distribution is motivated, how to characterize it
mathematically, and how to derive it empirically in order to generate clear, concise
policy conclusions.
In the present setting, the main policy conclusions are twofold. The first is that the
AMLC, during the period 1978:2S1988:4, should have increased, on average, its red
meats promotion allocations and that this increase should have been targeted to a
one-and-one-half to two-fold increase over the level of observed expenditure. The
second conclusion concerns the patterns of reallocation. First, a greater spread, with
more frequency in the right tail of the distribution, and, second, a concentration (a
series of repeated allocations) around $Aus 316,000 would have maximized the
overall return to the scheme, enhanced producer profits, and maximized returns to
the farmgate levy required to raise program revenues. These are the main conclu-
sions one can draw from the analysis; they are, arguably, the most important con-
clusions for promotion policy, and consequently are the ones we have focused on in
the present contribution.
Notwithstanding this focus, a host of other important policy questions remain.
A few are addressed above, whereas others are available from modest extensions
of the present methodology. The addressed issues are the validity of maintained
hypotheses including the existence of a maximum (as opposed to a minimum) and
the positivity of the distribution of the optimum, given its existence. As this
analysis has shown, these questions—which are fundamental to the optimization
hypothesis—are easily refuted or confirmed empirically.
Of the remaining questions, interest centers on the (comparative-static) effects of
(optimal) responses in promotion to changes in the economic environment, such as
shifts in retail demand, shifts in costs of production in the marketing sector, and
shifts in supply conditions in the farm sector itself. Magnitudes of optimal responses
to changes in, say, prices of retail-competing products (in this case, beef and pork),
changes in expenditures on particular commodity groups (presently, meats), changesHolloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   149
in food-marketing costs (presently approximated by labor wage rates), changes in
supply conditions (represented by wholesale lamb supply), or changes in commodity
promotion costs themselves are easily derived (either in point-estimate or distri-
bution form) by iterating the estimation procedure outlined in the appendix. These
estimates are important because they yield information regarding the appropriate
response by administrators to changes in the economic environment. In short, a
variety of policy information, additional to the central questions presently consid-
ered, are obtainable from modest extensions of the methodology.
Future work should aim to exploit this knowledge while relaxing simultaneously
some of the stringent assumptions employed currently, including a single-lag
response to promotion (e.g., Kinnucan, Chang, and Venkateswaran, 1993), a single-
commodity marketing channel (e.g., Kinnucan, 1996), a single-promotion medium,
but most importantly that the goal of promotion is to maximize static, nonstochastic
producer surplus.
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Appendix
In this appendix we present details underlying some of the essential formulae
appearing in the text. We first transform equation (1) into an expression that is more
amenable to empirical analysis. In this endeavor, we make use of some additional
notation and three results that follow from basic assumptions in Holloway (1998,
p. 188). First, given equality between the variable costs of promotion, C(π), and the
revenue raised to cover them, R(τ, π), the rate of change in the tax rate that arises in





Second, assuming the usual situation in which the promotion program’s demand for
resources is small in relation to total demand, free entry and exit into the promotion
industry ensures that the promotion-costs function exhibits locally constant returns
to scale. Thus, assume that C(π) / κπ, where κ denotes the per unit cost of promo-
tion output. Accordingly, the first term in the numerator in (A1) is
(A2) Cπ ' κ.
Without loss of generality, assume that the tax rate τ denotes a per unit (excise) rate
of taxation. Accordingly, with q(τ, π) denoting equilibrium quantity, receipts from
taxation are R(τ, π) / τq(τ, π). Hence, the second term in the numerator in (A1) is
(A3) Rπ ' τqπ,
and the term in the denominator is
(A4) Rτ ' q % τqτ.
Third, consider the (inverse) farm-commodity supply schedule depicting producers’
real opportunity costs of production, In equilibrium, where both p ' S(q), Sq >0 .
price and quantity are functions of the policy instruments [that is, p = p(τ, π) and
q = q(τ, π)], we have when the tax rate changes, and when pro- pτ' Sqqτ pπ' Sqqπ
motion adjusts. Consequently, when both the tax rate and the level of promotion are
adjusted simultaneously,
(A5) pτqπ ' pπqτ.
Equations (A1)S(A5) can now be applied to text equation (1) in order to derive a
condition that is more amenable to analysis. Substituting, in turn, equations (A1),
(A2), (A3), and (A4) into equation (1) and rearranging, we haveHolloway Commodity Promotion as an Experiment   151
(A6)   pτ(κ & τqπ) % pπ(q % τqτ) ' 0.
Using (A5),
(A7) pτκ % pπq ' 0.
Applying text equation (3),
(A8)   pττ % pππ ' 0.
Finally, normalizing on p … 0, we have
(A9) Epτ % Epπ ' 0,
where  denotes the elasticity of variable i with respect to variable Eij/ (Mi/Mj)(j/i)
j. Equation (A9) provides the key link between the theoretical optimum and its
empirical measurement. Intuitively, because taxation leads to losses in producer
surplus and because promotion (presumably) effects benefits, equation (A9) defines
the familiar rule that, at the optimum, the marginal (producer) benefit from promo-
tion,  must equal the marginal cost,  or that the net marginal benefits of the Epπ, &Epτ,
commodity promotion scheme must be exhausted. However, a second and more
important feature of (A9) is that it is, in principle, observable given data on prices
and quantities and the levels of the relevant instruments, τ and π.
When interest centers on empirically testing condition (A9), a test procedure
evolves in three steps. First, we consider the set of quasi-reduced forms that charac-
terize equilibrium in the food channel. Second, we impose on these equations the
identity implied by the cost-equals-revenue constraint. Third, we identify from the
corresponding set of reduced-form equations a set of restrictions that are equivalent
to, but more informative than, the one in (A9). These concepts are formalized as
follows. Farmgate equilibrium in the presence of promotion is
(A10)   p ' ƒp(τ; π; z1,...,zn&2),
  q ' ƒq(τ; π; z1,...,zn&2),
where  denote the (quasi) reduced forms depicting price and quantity, ƒp(·) and ƒq(·)
and  represents the effects of other variables on the equilibrium. z / (z1,...,zn&2)N
Recall that the tax rate and the level of promotion effort are related by the budget
constraint in text equation (3). In this case, (A10) and (3), together, comprise a three-
equation structural system, with endogenous variables p, q, and either the tax rate,
τ, or the level of promotion effort, π, as endogenous variables. Displacing the
system, expressing the resulting derivatives in proportional-change terms, we obtain
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(A11)   ˜ p ' Epτ˜ τ % Epπ˜ π % Epz1 ˜ z1, ..., Epzn&2 ˜ zn&2,
   ˜ q ' Eqτ˜ τ % Eqπ˜ π % Eqz1 ˜ z1, ..., Eqzn&2 ˜ zn&2,
and, from text equation (3),
(A12)   ˜ κ % ˜ π ' ˜ τ % ˜ q,
where  denotes proportional change in variable v. With τ endogenous, the ˜ v / ∆v/v
system is
(A13) By ' Γx,
where denotes an m-vector of movements in the endogenous y(m×1) / (˜ p,˜ q,˜ τ)N
variables, denotes  an  n-vector of movements in the x(n×1) / (˜ π;˜ κ;˜ z1,..., ˜ zn&2)N








Epπ Epz1 ... Epzn&2
Eqπ Eqz1 ... Eqzn&2
1 1 ... 0
.
The solution in (A13) is
(A16) y ' Φx,
where defined  as Φ(m×n),
(A17)  Φ /
ψpπ ψpκ ψpz1 ... ψpzn&2
ψqπ ψqκ ψqz1 ... ψqzn&2
ψτπ ψτκ ψτz1 ... ψτzn&2
,
satisfies  Finally, focusing attention on (A16), applying Cramer’s rule in Φ ' B&1Γ.
(A13), and using (A6), we have the following as the relationship between the













where *B*/1 % Eqτ … 0.
Because they relate closely to the optimality condition (A9), relations (A18)
provide the basis for empirical examination of the optimality hypothesis. The natural
strategy is to test the (point) null hypothesis that the parameter  is zero. This ψpπ
condition, we note, is equivalent to the condition that the parameter  is zero ψqπ
because the elasticities in the numerators in (A18) are monotonic transformations of
each other, with the supply flexibility g $ 0 acting as the scale factor. Nevertheless,
having tested these hypotheses, the problem arises in inferring difference between
optimal and observed levels of promotion expenditure. A solution to this problem
is proposed below.
Text equations (5), (6), and (7) provide the essential observations, and an esti-
mating algorithm is derived in three consecutive steps. First, a relationship is derived
between a parameter representing the desired level of promotion expenditure and the
empirically observed data. Second, the (posterior) distribution of the optimal level
of program expenditure is identified from a nonlinear transformation of the reduced
form. Third, the posterior distribution thus derived is compared with the observed
frequencies of actual expenditure, and recommendations are made about changes in
expenditure levels.
Given the distributional assumption on the error matrix, the joint posterior for the
covariance matrix (Ω) and the regression parameters (Π), conditional on the data
(Ξ), is normal-inverse-Wishart (Zellner, 1971, pp. 224S240). Although this result is
standard in the multivariate-normal, linear setting, this point is worth emphasizing
because it is fundamental to the sampling procedure. Put another way, the joint
posterior has the component, conditional forms:
(A19) Ω*Ξ ~ inverse-Wishart (W (, v(),
Π*Ω, Ξ ~ matricvariate-normal (Π(, ΩqM
&1
( ),
where the definitions of the (data-plus-prior) parameters  are (W (, v(, Π(,a n dM()
presented in Drèze and Richard (1983, pp. 539S541). Given the relationships
between parameters  and parameter matrices Π and Ω in text equation α,ˆ π,a n dg,
(7), the normal-inverse-Wishart form can be used to simulate draws from the
distributions  Denoting the element in the ith row and g(α*Ξ), g(ˆ π*Ξ), and g(g*Ξ).
the jth column of Π by  the sampling procedure that simulates draws from the Πij,
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STEP 1. Generate a draw  from the inverse-Wishart  Ω(s) (W (, v().
STEP 2. Generate a draw  from the matricvariate-normal  Π(s) (Π(, Ω(s)qM
&1
( ),
where  is the draw in step 1. Ω(s)
STEP 3.
Compute where 
ˆ π(s) '& Π21(s)/Π11(s) and g(s) ' Π12(s)/Π11(s), Π11(s),
are elements of  drawn in step 2. Π12(s),a n dΠ21(s) Π(s)
STEP 4. Repeat steps 1 through 3 a large number of times, S.
Let denote a {α(s), s '1,2,...,S}, {ˆ π(s), s '1,2,...,S}, and {g(s), s '1,2,...,S}
sequence of draws so obtained. With S set large, this sequence provides a good
approximation to the (post-data) marginal distributions  and g(α*Ξ), g(ˆ π*Ξ),
and their Monte Carlo approximations are retrieved by plotting histograms g(g*Ξ),
over increments in their domains. Efficient algorithms for drawing from matric-
variate-normal and inverse-Wishart distributions are outlined in Bauwens (1984)
and in Gelman et al. (1997).